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Purpose of this Work Project  
Due to an increasingly complex business environment, it is more and more difficult 
for companies to have a centralized control
1
 over their differently located activities. 
Therefore, companies decentralize.   
One of the major consequences of decentralization is the creation of responsibility 
centers
2
. One way to evaluate the performance of these centers is through the 
controllability principle which states that each responsibility center must be charged 
only with those costs / revenues that can be influenced by its manager (Drury, 2008). If 
the company follows this principle, it has to assess the performance of the responsibility 
center (determining its economic contribution
3
) and also the performance of its 
manager (assessing his/her controllable contribution
4
).  
The application of this principle by companies has been scarcely researched 
(Burkett, Fischer and Schaffer, 2011). This may explain the reduced number of teaching 
case studies on such topic. As such, the purpose of this Work Project is to elaborate a 
teaching case study, as well as its corresponding teaching note
5
, on how the 
controllability principle can be applied in a real-life situation and how, in that situation, 
controllable and non-controllable costs/revenues can be differentiated so that the 
performance of the managers and responsibility centers is evaluated.  
                                                          
1
 Where decisions are taken by the top management, without any delegation of power to the lower 
management levels. 
2
 Are units (departments/ divisions/ business units within a company) each led by a manager who is 
responsible for accomplishing all the objectives set up for that center. 
3
 Represents the contribution that the center is making to corporate overheads and profits. 
4
 Computed by deducting from total center revenues all costs controllable by the center’s manager.  
5
 Proposal of guidance about how the teaching case study should be used in classes by the instructor. 
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Access was granted by Electricidade dos Açores, SA
6
, where the controllability 
principle is present, but not totally applied, which allowed fulfilling the purpose of this 
Work Project. Its outcome - this teaching case study - will be used by instructors when 
lecturing the topic of Responsibility Centers and Evaluation of their Performance 
and of their Managers in master courses such as Advanced Managerial Accounting 
and Management Control Systems.  
  
                                                          
6
 I gratefully acknowledge the access and cooperation of Electricidade dos Açores, SA, to do this work. In 
particular, I appreciate the availability of Dra. Gilda Pimentel, Dra Sofia Ferreira, and in particular of Dr. 
Fernando Ferreira. Without their collaboration it would not have been possible to do the present work 
project. 
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Case Narrative  
THE CONTROLLABILITY PRINCIPLE AT EDA 
 The manager of the Planning, Management Control and Regulation Department of 
Electricidade dos Açores, SA (henceforth named EDA), Mr. Smith
7
, was in his office at 
the company’s headquarters in Ponta Delgada, S. Miguel
8
 in a warm late afternoon of 
August 2011, when he was confronted with a new concept - the controllability principle. 
Thus, he decided to contact several consultants and subsequently contracted one in 
order to study whether the company was a good candidate to implement this principle, 
as well as to see what major changes this implementation would bring to the actual 
organizational structure
9
 at EDA and to the performance evaluation of its centers as well 
as their managers. 
1. History of EDA 
EDA was constituted on August, 18
th
 1981, by the decision of the Azores’ Regional 
Assembly, because the electricity sector in this region was going through some 
difficulties. In the origin of these difficulties were bad quality service and high costs due 
to the lack of coordination between the eighteen companies that were responsible for the 
provision of electricity in Azores until 1981, the defects in the installations and the 
shortage of funding. EDA was created as a state-owned company with the objective to 
establish and explore the public service of production, transmission/distribution, and 
sale/commercialization of electricity throughout the Azorean islands. 
                                                          
7
 Disguised name 
8
 One of the nine Azores islands in the Atlantic ocean that belong to Portugal.  
9
 See exhibit 1. 
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Throughout the years, EDA was seen as a successful company, receiving trophies 
that recognized it as one of the largest companies in Azores, both in sales volume and in 
number of employees. 
In the 90’s of last century, several changes and investments happened at the 
company. In these years, EDA implemented SAP
10
 and SAP I-SU
11
 which made 
possible to integrate all information in a unique technological platform. Also, the 
communications between collaborators, managers and top management started to be 
done with a tool which allows attaching any document, thereby eliminating paper 
circulation. It was also in this decade that EDA started to make investments in 
alternative energies, such as hydroelectric power stations, wind parks and geothermic 
energy, with the objective to preserve the environment. For that, EDA bought more than 
50% of the capital of SOGEO (Produção de Energia Geotérmica na ilha de S.Miguel) 
and EEG (Produção de Energia Eólica e Hídrica) among other companies. On April, 8
th
 
1997, EDA was transformed into a limited company. 
In 2000 a major internal restructuration of the company began, which led to the 
extinction of operating centers per island and the creation of three major vertical 
business areas: Production, Transmission/Distribution and Sale/Commercialization. In 
2003, ERSE (the Portuguese Energy Services Regulatory Authority) started to regulate 
the Azorean market, which meant that EDA was not able to set its own selling prices 
anymore, thereby being subject to ERSE tariffs.  
It was also during the first decade of the XXI Century that the first steps to privatize 
the company began. In 2005, 33,92% of EDA share capital was sold to Energy and 
Azores’ Services, S.A. (ESA), and 5,98% to employees, small subscribers and 
                                                          
10
 Modules of Accounting, Personnel, Procurement, Property, Cash Management  
11
 Invoicing and collection of energy and power  
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emigrants. In 2006, ESA increased its participation in EDA to approximately 40% of its 
share capital. 
2. The current EDA’s businesses  
EDA operates in a market that has been regulated. Therefore the company was 
organized taking this into account. EDA is divided in three business areas that constitute 
the core of its regulated activity:  
1. Acquisition and Production of Electricity and System Management 
(corresponding to Production – see exhibit 1) which includes all processes and 
resources that are involved in the acquisition of electricity from external entities 
(mostly renewable energies’ suppliers) and in the production (by its own 
means) of electricity from fuel and diesel oil.  
2. Transmission/Distribution of Electricity which includes all processes and 
resources needed in the transportation and distribution of electricity in High, 
Medium and Low voltage  from the production plants to the delivery points of 
electricity to clients; this business area also includes the construction, operation 
and maintenance of its infrastructures. 
3. Sale/Commercialization of Electricity which sells electricity and power12 to 
all Azorean clients, according to their type (such as domestic and industrial 
clients) and level of voltage consumed, as well as related services.  
Besides these three regulated activities, the company also performs non-regulated 
activities not related to electricity which are developed by EDA collaborators. These 
                                                          
12
 Rate at which energy is transmitted or the amount of energy required or expended for a given unit of 
time. 
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collaborators are required by superiors to develop certain activities for EDA, but also to 
do specific activities of the other companies like SOGEO and EEG.  
Currently EDA, S.A employs 674 workers. 
3. The Market Environment 
The electricity market in Continental Portugal and in its Autonomous Regions – 
Madeira (RAM) and Azores (RAA) – is regulated by ERSE which sets guidelines and 
definitions of the electricity tariffs and their components (such as Energy Tariff and the 
Tariff for the Use of Transmission Network). However, nowadays, this is an almost 
liberalized sector in Continental Portugal since, not only can the final consumers choose 
their electricity supplier, such as EDP Comercial, SA, Galp Power, SA, Endesa, 
Sucursal Portuguesa and Iberdrola, but also the tariffs distributed in High and Medium 
voltage are defined by the market. From the end of 2012, all electricity tariffs will be 
fully defined by the market in Continental Portugal  
The electricity tariffs (Low voltage for Continental Portugal, Medium and Low 
voltage for RAA) to charge to the final consumers are annually fixed by ERSE and are 
calculated based on the principle of additive tariff. The latter consists of the sum of the 
several regulated activity tariffs associated with the services used by each client along 
the value chain of the electric sector (Apolinário, Felizardo, Leite Garcia, Oliveira, 
Trindade, Verdelho, 2006). 
Until the end of 2012, the electricity suppliers with activities being regulated will 
only have a part in the setting of their tariffs in Continental Portugal. Besides the 
principle of additive tariff, ERSE sets the tariffs to generate a certain income (or profit) 
to each electricity supplier. This income is calculated based on each supplier’s estimates 
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of its electricity sales, operational costs and investments. These estimates must be 
delivered to and previously approved by ERSE. 
Yet, based on European legislation (Directives 2003/54/CE and 2009/72/CE) there 
was the possibility to avoid the openness of the market in some EU areas such as the 
areas considered to be a “small isolated network” and “isolated micro-network”. The 
latter is defined as “a network which annual consumption in 1996 was inferior to 
500GWh and with no connection to other networks”
13
. According to this definition, the 
RAA and all its nine islands are considered to be an “isolated micro-network”, since the 
total consumption of electricity in all islands in 1996 was 337,5GWh and there is no 
connection to other networks. Therefore, in 2004, through the Directive 2004/920/CE, 
RAA was excluded from the liberalization of the electricity sector, which means that 
EDA is the only electricity supplier in RAA, but must sell at the electricity tariffs 
previously approved by ERSE. 
By the end of 2012, although the tariffs will be fully defined by the market in 
Continental Portugal, this will not happen in the RAA. In Azores, all the tariffs of the 
regulated areas will continue to be defined by ERSE, with only a small change on the 
establishment of the tariffs of the Acquisition and Production of Electricity and System 
Management (corresponding to Production). In this business area, and from 2012 to 
2014, such tariffs will be set based on incentives with a definition of efficiency goals. 
The other two business areas will keep the same regulation process.   
4. The Responsibility Centers in EDA 
As a consequence of the internal restructuration within EDA in 2000 there was the 
creation of responsibility centers, which are, nowadays, sixteen. This was what the 
                                                          
13 
Directive 2003/54/CE, article 2, point 27 
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consultant contracted by Mr. Smith could conclude after having asked for EDA’s 
organizational structure (see exhibit 1) and consulted some other internal documents. 
Also, based on these internal documents, the consultant saw that two of the centers were 
defined, by the company, as cost centers, whereas all the other fourteen were defined as 
profit centers. Although deciding the investments of all the other centers, the Top 
Management center was also considered a profit center by EDA (see Exhibit 2 for the 
complete list of the responsibility centers in EDA). According to the manager of the 
Planning, Management Control and Regulation Department, all of these fourteen 
centers are profit centers because they  
“represent aggregations of activities (reflecting the organizational structure), 
and these aggregations allow the measurement of performance in terms of 
costs and revenues of each department
14
 of EDA.”.  
Regarding the cost centers, they are generating only costs which are under the 
classification of Class 6 – Expenditures of the SNC (Sistema de Normalização 
Contabilistica which is the Portuguese adaptation of the IASB financial reporting 
standards framework). Regarding the profit centers they are generating costs that are 
under the classification of Class 6 of the SNC and revenues under the classification of 
Class 7 – Revenues of the SNC.  
None of the investment decisions are being taken in the centers itself. The decisions 
of EDA’s investments are analyzed and studied in a specific center (Planning and 
Investment Analysis) and then are inserted in the Annual Business Plan of the company, 
which must be approved by the top management and afterwards by the shareholders’ 
General Assembly.  
                                                          
14
 Which corresponds to responsibility center in EDA. 
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5. The Controllability Principle 
In order to analyze the possibility to implement the controllability principle in 
EDA, the consultant needed to know what influence the managers have in both revenues 
and costs generation, with the objective of seeing what is controllable and non-
controllable by them. 
The consultant decided to concentrate first on the three main business areas. Since 
these areas are regulated, the consultant wanted to know to what extent these areas are 
really regulated. For that reason he asked Mr. Smith if the influence of the managers of 
the three areas is on revenues only, or also on costs. Mr. Smith provided a Profit & Loss 
Account per area (see Exhibit 3) in order for the consultant to study the costs and 
revenues of the three main areas. 
When analyzing the P&L Account, the consultant identified three items that are 
major contributors to each area’s costs: 
 In the Production area, the Cost of Goods Sold and Materials Consumed, 
Expenses with Miscellaneous Services and Personnel Expenses.   
 In the Transmission/Distribution and the Sale/Commercialization areas, 
Expenses with Miscellaneous Services and Personnel Expenses.  
The consultant then found that in the case of the Personnel Expenses, the manager 
of each area can only decide on the quantity of the Personnel resources (number of 
employees) used in each area; the decision regarding the salary of every worker of the 
different business areas must be approved by the Human Resources Management center. 
Considering the Expenses with Miscellaneous Services, the manager of each area is 
only able to decide on the quantity of these services. The choice of the suppliers of such 
services, when they imply a contract (for example phones, insurance), as well as their 
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purchase price, have to be decided by the top management. If the purchase does not 
imply a contract, the decision on suppliers and the purchasing prices is the 
responsibility of several centers (for example, if the manager needs a book or some 
technical documentation he/she asks for it to the Secretariat of the Board of Directors 
and then this center buys what was demanded; if the manager needs some office 
material he/she makes asks for it to the Procurement center, and then this center buys 
it.) Finally, regarding the Costs of Goods Sold and Materials Consumed, the manager of 
the area is only responsible for deciding the quantity of raw materials to be used by the 
center (such as fuel and reserve pieces); every decision on the acquisition of these 
materials (including deciding the suppliers and the purchasing price) is the 
responsibility of the Procurement center. 
Subsequently the consultant looked at the revenues of the three main business 
areas, particularly the ones in Sales and Services. Such revenues of the Production, 
Transmission/Distribution and Sale/Commercialization centers are regulated by ERSE 
through the setting of tariffs. The values of Sales and Services that appear in Exhibit 3 
(P&L per area) are generated through the allocation of the total sales to the final 
consumers to the three main areas. This means that in case of the Production area, the 
Sales and Services are calculated by multiplying the total consumption of electricity by 
the final consumers of EDA by the Energy Tariff, the Tariff for the Use of Transmission 
Network and the Tariff for the Global Use of System (which are established only for the 
Production area), the Sales and Services of the Transmission/Distribution area are 
calculated based on that same total consumption and the Tariff for the Use of 
Distribution Networks (this tariff is only set up for this area), and finally the Sales and 
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Services of the Sale/Commercialization area are based on the total consumption and the 
Retail Commercial tariff (this  tariff is only considered in this area). 
After the analysis of the three main business areas, the consultant decided to 
concentrate on the other centers classified as profit centers at EDA. Regarding their 
revenues, they come basically from services provided. These can be related with either 
the assignment of qualified staff of EDA to the other companies that belong to EDA (for 
example SOGEO and EEG) or with specific services provided to the latter (like 
accounting, payroll, and cash management). EDA supports the costs, the main being 
Personnel Expenses, with these services. For that reason when assigning one of its 
workers, EDA charges the cost associated with that worker to the company he/she was 
assigned using labor/hour rates.  
Concerning the costs of these other profit centers, the consultant found out that they 
were the same as the costs of the three main business areas, meaning that, all of these 
other profit centers were generating mostly Cost of Goods Sold and Materials 
Consumed, Expenses with Miscellaneous Services and Personnel Expenses. But, when 
considering the costs, it was very difficult for the consultant to make a generalized 
analysis of the influence of the managers on the generation of costs, since it depended 
on the center. So he decided to make the following scheme about the decisions on costs: 
Centers 
Decision on suppliers and purchasing 
prices in all centers including their own Decision on 
quantity of 
resources in 
their own 
center 
Personnel 
Expenses 
Cost of Goods 
Sold and 
Materials 
Consumed 
Expenses with 
Miscellaneous 
Services 
Top Management; Secretariat of the Board; Information 
Systems; Finance and Insurance; Construction of 
Infrastructures and Equipment Centers 
  × × 
Human Resource Management ×   × 
Procurement  × × × 
Auditing; Planning, Management Control and Regulation; 
Other Entities; Electrical Management Systems    × 
(Source: Adapted from internal documents) 
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Finally, the consultant analyzed the costs of the two cost centers. They also were 
generating mostly Cost of Goods Sold and Materials Consumed, Expenses with 
Miscellaneous Services and Personnel Expenses, which means that the analysis of these 
costs had already been done by the consultant: these two managers did not have any 
control over purchasing prices and over the choice of suppliers in any of the costs of 
their centers. 
After this analysis of costs and revenues in EDA, the consultant had a better idea on 
what was controllable and what was not controllable by the managers. Regarding the 
managers responsible for the three main areas, their influence was very restrict, i.e.,  
they were not able to influence either the quantity or the price of the electricity sold, but 
they had control on the quantity of the resources that were consumed by their center, 
albeit none over the price of those resources. Considering the managers of the rest of the 
centers, they all control the quantity of units in the revenues. But, when considering the 
costs, it was very difficult for the consultant to generalize what was controllable and 
non-controllable by the managers, since it depended on the center. 
6. Proposed Assignment Questions 
After analyzing all the collected information from EDA, the consultant hired you to 
assist him in preparing the answer to the request of Mr. Smith. As such, discuss the 
following questions: 
1. Based on the information (theoretical and of EDA) you know already about 
responsibility centers: 
1.1.Do you think that the Production, Transmission/Distribution and 
Sales/Commercialization Centers are profit centers? Why? 
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1.2.What about the other 11 responsibility centers that EDA classifies as profit 
centers? Do you agree with this classification? Why? 
 
1.3.There are no transfer prices in EDA. Consider the hypothesis of 
implementing them among the three main business areas: 
1.3.1. Could the classification of the three centers be affected by this 
decision? Why and how? 
 
2. Now consider the information (theoretical and of EDA) you know about the 
controllability principle: 
 
2.1.How would you evaluate the manager of each profit center?  
 
2.2.What would you change in the internal documents (for example the P&L 
Account) to make it easy to distinguish between controllable and non-
controllable items? 
 
2.3.Consider again the hypothesis of implementing transfer prices between the 
three main business areas: 
2.3.1. How would this decision affect the managers’ influence on the 
generation of revenues and costs? 
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Exhibits 
Exhibit 1 – EDA’s organizational structure   
(Source: Adapted from internal documents) 
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Exhibit 2 – List of EDA’s Centers in 2010 
Name of the Center Type of Center 
Top Management Profit Center 
Secretariat of the Board Profit Center 
Quality and Environment Management Cost Center 
Auditing Profit Center 
Planning, Management Control and Regulation Profit Center 
Other Entities Profit Center 
Finance and Insurance Profit Center 
Human Resource Management Profit Center 
Information Systems Profit Center 
Procurement Profit Center 
Planning and Investment Analysis Cost Center 
Construction of Infrastructures and Equipments Profit Center 
Electrical Management Systems Profit Center 
Production Profit Center 
Transmission/Distribution Profit Center 
Sales/Commercialization Profit Center 
(Source: Adapted from internal documents) 
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Exhibit 3 – Profit & Loss Accounts of the three main business areas 
 (Source: Adapted from internal documents) 
  
 Year 2010 
Item Production 
Transmission/ 
Distribution 
Sale/ 
Commercialization 
Total 
Sales and Services 130.805.604 33.507.811 4.649.783 168.963.199 
Operating Subsidies 1.570 1.863 169.895 173.328 
Gains and Losses in Subsidiaries, Associates and Joint Ventures 8.574.482 0 0 8.574.482 
Changes in Inventories of Production 0 0 0 0 
Own Work Entity 1.462.299 8.552.996 23.782 10.039.076 
Cost of Goods Sold and Materials Consumed 87.243.379 5.861.542 4.897 93.109.818 
Expenses with Miscellaneous Services 4.276.278 6.136.695 2.782.344 13.195.317 
Personnel Expenses 11.674.808 11.508.515 2.978.709 26.162.032 
Inventory Impairment (losses / reversals) 8.240 51.301 447 59.989 
Impairment of Receivables (losses / reversals) 0 0 177.152 177.152 
Impairment of Investments not depreciable / amortizable (losses / reversals) 0 0 0 0 
Provisions (Increases / Decreases) 0 0 0 0 
Increases / Decreases in Fair Value 9.894 0 0 9.894 
Other Income and Gains 4.964.556 866.342 609.722 6.440.620 
Other Expenses and Losses 849.331 595.681 15.929 1.460.940 
Gross Margin 43.562.225 27.592.338 4.644.714 75.799.277 
EBITDA - Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 41.746.582 18.775.277 -506.296 60.015.563 
Spending / Reversal of Depreciation and Amortization 12.461.119 8.253.667 374.734 21.089.521 
Impairment of Depreciable Investment / Installment (losses / reversals 0 0 0 0 
EBIT - Operating Income (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes) 29.285.463 10.521.610 -881.030 38.926.042 
Interest Income obtained 510.828 369.285 14.999 895.112 
Interest and Similar Expenses Supported 3.580.148 2.583.453 111.677 6.275.278 
Income Before Taxes 26.216.143 8.307.442 -977.709 33.545.876 
Income tax period 2.448.921 1.029.937 -1.588 3.477.270 
Net Income  23.767.222 7.277.504 -976.121 30.068.606 
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Teaching Note 
Overview: 
Mr. Smith, the manager of the Planning, Management Control and Regulation 
Department, was confronted by the concept of controllability principle and wanted to 
know if EDA was a good candidate to apply it. To do this, Mr. Smith contracted an 
external consultant. The latter asked for EDA’s current organizational structure and for 
information about the responsibility centers created at EDA, since this is an important 
issue when studying the controllability principle. Internal information on how the 
managers can and cannot make decisions in their centers was also required by the 
consultant in order to assess the level of influence that those managers have on the 
generation of revenues and costs of their centers in EDA. After analyzing all the 
collected information, the consultant hired the students to help him on how to answer 
the request made by Mr. Smith.  
Teaching Objectives: 
This teaching case study can be used in masters’ courses in Accounting, such as 
Advanced Managerial Accounting and Management Control Systems, to give the 
students the chance: 
1) To understand how responsibility centers should be defined in a practical way; 
2) To know all the different types of responsibility centers and how they are 
applied in a practical way; 
3) To see how the controllability principle can be applied in a company; 
4) To explore the topic of transfer prices; 
5) And finally, to develop their skills in making improvement proposals and in 
discussing cases. 
 
 19 
Results of the test of the case study: 
This case was tested in two different situations. The first one was with the person at 
EDA with whom the access to the company was negotiated in order to see if the 
information was all correct. The feedback was very positive, aside from some small 
aspects that needed to be changed. The second one was tested by students of different 
nationalities and from different universities doing their master degree at NOVA School 
of Business & Economics. Two of the students were foreign: one was a French student, 
23 years old, from Emlyon Business School and student of the Master in Management, 
specialization in Marketing; the other was a British student, 22 years old, from the 
London Business School, student of the Master in Management; the third student was 
Portuguese, 22 years old, from Nova SBE, student of the Master in Finance and with 
Accounting background, based on the attendance of Accounting courses in both 
Undergraduate in Economics and Master in Finance. 
The test with students was very important in order to know if the information in the 
case was sufficient to answer the assignment questions, if the information was 
understandable, and to see what major topics the students refer when answering the 
questions.  Some parts that were included in the text of the teaching case study read by 
the three students were taken out from it, because the feedback from them was that it 
was confusing, and since those parts were not relevant for the case itself, they were 
deleted.  
In what concerns the assignment questions about responsibility centers, there was 
some difficulty from the students with no Accounting background to simply define what 
those centers consist in. Since this case is for students that are attending courses like 
Advanced Managerial Accounting and Management Control Systems , the students will 
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be able to know the main concepts of the main topic of this Work Project, and therefore 
to apply it correctly when answering those questions. In fact, this was what happened 
with the student that attended some of these courses. 
The students did not have any difficulty to answer the questions regarding the 
controllability principle, since it is an easy concept to understand and apply. In their 
answers, the students referred most of the topics that are suggested in the case analysis. 
Basic Issues: 
1. Responsibility Centers: Cost Centers; Profit Centers; Investment Centers 
2. Controllability Principle: Controllable contribution (to evaluate the 
performance of the manager); Economic contribution (to evaluate the 
performance of an investment or profit center) 
Case Analysis 
1. Based on the information (theoretical and of EDA) you know already about 
responsibility centers: 
1.1.Do you think that the Production, Transmission/Distribution and 
Sales/Commercialization Centers are profit centers? Why? 
Theoretical information to consider: 
The instructor must lead the students to revise firstly the definition of responsibility 
centers which consist on units (departments/divisions/business units within a company) 
each one led by a manager who is responsible for accomplishing all the objectives set 
up for that center. Secondly, the students should revise the definitions of cost center and 
a profit center, such as those presented by Atkinson, Kaplan, Matsumura and Young 
(2007, p. 584 and 586): 
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-  “Cost Centers are responsibility centers in which the employees control costs but 
do not control revenues or investment levels” 
- “Profit Centers are responsibility centers in which managers and other employees 
control both revenues and the costs of the products or services they deliver. (…) 
senior management, not the responsibility center management, controls the level 
of investment in the responsibility center.” 
 If the students do not add anything else to the above definition of profit centers, the 
instructor must motivate them to be more specific and think whether in this type of 
responsibility center, and according to Drury (2008), the managers are normally free to 
set selling prices, select suppliers, accept prices of services that must be acquired, etc. 
Information of the case to consider: 
 Students must argue that there are three main aspects to take into consideration in 
this question: 
- The managers of Production, Transmission/Distribution and 
Sales/Commercialization centers control the component of the costs related to  the 
quantities of resources used  in these centers;  
-  Their activities are regulated, which means that although these centers have 
revenues, their managers do not control them because the selling tariffs are set and 
regulated by ERSE ;  
- The investment decisions related to the three business areas are taken at the top 
management level. 
Conclusions: 
Students must answer that, based on the definitions of what is a cost center and a 
profit center, the centers responsible for the three main business areas of EDA are not 
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correctly classified. The major problem is the fact the managers do not control the 
revenues, and for this reason they cannot be considered a profit center. So, the 
Production, Transmission/Distribution and Sales/Commercialization centers should be 
considered cost centers since the managers only control the quantity of resources of 
costs used by their centers. 
1.2.What about the other 11 responsibility centers that EDA classifies as profit 
centers? Do you agree with this classification? Why? 
At this point, the instructor must guide the students to distinguish between the Top 
Management center and the other 10 centers that are classified as profit centers at EDA 
according to exhibit 2 of the teaching case study.  
Theoretical information to consider: 
To help students understand why they need to make this distinction, the instructor 
must ask for the definition of an investment center. Students might refer the definition 
included in Atkinson, Kaplan, Matsumura and Young (2007, p. 587):  
- “Investment Centers are responsibility centers in which the managers and other 
employees control revenues, costs, and the level of investment.” 
The students can also add what Drury (2008, p. 396) mentions about this type of 
responsibility center: 
- “Investment Centers represent the highest level of managerial autonomy. They 
include the company as a whole, operating subsidiaries, operating groups and 
divisions.” 
Information of the case to consider: 
 When discussing this question among them, the students must point out the 
following aspects that have to be taken into account: 
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- The Top Management center at EDA is considered a profit center but must 
approve all the investment decisions that occur in the company; 
- The other 10 centers typified as profit centers by the company are led by 
managers that are responsible for costs and some revenues, whereas the levels of 
investment are imposed by the top management. 
Conclusions: 
 Based on what was discussed before, the students must firstly conclude that the Top 
Management center is not correctly classified. They must add that this incorrect 
classification is due to the fact that such center is the top of the organization and 
represents the highest level of managerial autonomy at EDA. In addition, all the 
investment decisions are taken in this center by EDA’s top management. Therefore the 
Top Management center must not be considered a profit center but instead an 
investment center. 
The second conclusion from the students must be that the other 10 centers that EDA 
considers as profit centers are well defined. Their managers control the quantity of 
resources consumed and the revenues that the center generates, and the decisions on 
investments are taken at the top management level. 
1.3.There are no transfer prices in EDA. Consider the hypothesis of 
implementing them among the three main business areas: 
1.3.1. Could the classification of the three centers be affected by this 
decision? Why and how? 
Theoretical information to consider: 
When answering this question the students must go back to the definition of a 
transfer price learnt in classes, in other words, the price that one division charges for a 
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product or service supplied to another division from the same organization. The 
instructor can then read the following sentence from Drury and El-Shishini (2005, p. 
10): 
- “This practice [transfer prices] creates pseudo-divisionalized profit centers. 
Separate profits can be reported for each division, but the divisional managers 
have limited authority for sourcing and pricing decision.” 
Conclusions: 
The students must realize that the classification of the three centers responsible for 
the main business areas in EDA will change if the practice of transfer pricing is applied 
between them. However, if applied, the students must acknowledge that the true 
requirements of a profit center will not be met. Therefore, the three centers should be 
classified as “Pseudo-Profit centers”, since, according to Drury and El-Shishini (2005), 
their managers will have a limited control on choosing the suppliers and the selling 
price to external clients will still be set by ERSE, which means that the managers of 
these areas will only have authority on the internal price decisions – the transfer prices. 
2. Now consider the information (theoretical and of EDA) you know about the 
controllability principle: 
2.1.How would you evaluate the manager of each profit center?  
In this question, the instructor should guide the students to consider the profit 
centers in EDA that are correctly classified as profit centers: all centers except 
Production, Transmission/Distribution, Sales/Commercialization, Top Management, 
Quality and Environment Management and Planning and Investment Analysis centers. 
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Theoretical information to consider: 
This question allows the students to revise and discuss what is controllable and 
non-controllable in these centers. To consolidate the discussion of the students and to 
help them to achieve a conclusion, the instructor can read the following sentence from 
Drury and El-Shishini (2005, p. 20): 
- “If the manager can control the quantity but not the price paid for the services 
bought, then the costs are partially controllable. Only the difference between 
actual and budgeted expenditure that is due to the usage of these services should 
be identified with the manager.” 
This question also favors the discussion of performance measurements and what 
should be included in those measurements. To finalize the discussion and to reach a 
conclusion, the instructor can add the following information from Atkinson, Kaplan, 
Matsumura and Young (2007, p.587): 
- “(…) organizations should not rely on profit center financial results for 
performance evaluations. Instead, detailed performance evaluations should 
include quality, material use (yield), labor use (yield), and service measures that 
the local units can control.” 
Conclusions: 
After the discussion, the students should be able to conclude that, since all 
managers of the correctly classified profit centers in EDA are responsible for controlling 
the quantity of resources consumed and revenues, they should be held responsible for 
any variance from the actual to the budgeted value of quantity. The manager must 
justify any of such variances and therefore the performance evaluation should take that 
into consideration. Also, after the discussion the students should mention some other 
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measurements that can be considered in the evaluation of the managers, such as quality 
of the service (mainly in the areas that deal with clients and suppliers), quality of the 
materials, satisfaction of the employees, among others. 
2.2.What would you change in the internal documents (for example the P&L 
Account) to make it easy to distinguish between controllable and non-
controllable items? 
In this question the students must be able to acknowledge the difficulty to 
distinguish between controllable and non-controllable items, and therefore propose a 
P&L Account per center considering the separation of controllable and non-controllable 
items.  
The instructor should guide the students to comprehend the difference between 
controllable contribution and contribution of an investment or profit center, and 
therefore the students should revise the definitions of Drury (2008, p. 480), which states 
that the controllable contribution “measures the ability of managers to use the 
resources under their control effectively”. On the other hand, the contribution of an 
investment or profit center
15
 represents the contribution that such center is making to 
corporate overheads and profits and is calculated by deducting from the controllable 
contribution the costs that are attributable to such centers but not controlled by their 
managers. 
After understanding the major changes that the P&L will suffer, the students must 
discuss on how to calculate the controllable costs in EDA. Since the managers are only 
responsible for controlling the quantity, the division should be charged with the actual 
quantity at the budgeted cost. 
                                                          
15
 Divisional contribution in Drury (2008)’s terms.  
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Finally, after all the discussion, the students should be able to know the major 
contribution of doing this P&L. By doing this separation on the  P&L Account it is 
easier to see what is controllable by the manager, and therefore easier to measure his/her 
performance, and what is non-controllable by him/her. 
2.3.Consider again the hypothesis of implementing transfer prices between the 
three main business areas: 
2.3.1. How would this decision affect the managers’ influence on the 
generation of revenues and costs? 
The students must go back to the definition of transfer prices that was discussed 
before, and the instructor must lead them to talk about the changes that this practice 
would bring to the company if it was implemented. There are two possible situations in 
this discussion that would depend on the power of the managers to set the transfer price.  
The students can conclude after the discussion that if the top management is the one 
to establish the transfer price (situation that is more likely to happen at EDA), the 
manager still does not have any control over that price, and therefore her/his influence 
on the generation of revenues and costs is the same. But, if the top management gives 
power to the managers of the three main areas to establish a transfer price without 
interfering, the students must conclude that: 
1. The manager has influence on the transfer price to be set, and therefore it becomes 
a controllable item by the managers of the three main areas; 
2. The decision on transfer price must be taken into consideration on the evaluation 
of the managers; 
3. The center should be considered a “Pseudo-Profit center”. 
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